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The	  question	  of	  why	  animals	  sleep	  is	  an	  important	  and	  still	  largely	  unresolved	  issue	  
in	  evolutionary	  biology.	  A	  more	  fruitful	  approach	  might	  be	  to	  turn	  this	  question	  on	  
its	   head:	  Why	   do	   animals	   have	   waking	   periods?	   After	   all,	   being	   awake	   consumes	  
more	   energy	   than	   being	   asleep,	   and	   in	   some	   respects	   entails	   more	   risk	   (Cirelli	   &	  
Tononi,	   2008).	   In	   his	   stimulating	   Target	   Article,	   Johnson	   suggests	   a	   similar	   figure-­‐
ground	  inversion,	  inviting	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  biological	  origins	  of	  religion	  from	  a	  fresh	  
point	  of	  view:	  Ask	  not	  what	  religion	  is	  “for”,	  but	  what	  atheists	  are	  for.	  
	  
We	  appreciate	   this	   switch	  of	  perspective,	   and	  agree	   that	  we	   should	  at	   least	   check	  
that	   the	   inverse	   question	   isn’t	   the	   one	  we	   should	   all	   be	   focusing	   on.	  We	   applaud	  
Johnson’s	   pioneering	   spirit	   –	   now	   we	   have	   before	   us	   a	   family	   of	   ideas	   to	   take	  
seriously	  if	  we	  can,	  and	  to	  say	  why	  not	  if	  we	  think	  we	  shouldn’t.	  Of	  course,	  it’s	  only	  
to	  be	  expected	  that	  venturing	  in	  a	  pioneering	  spirit	  is	  fraught	  with	  peril,	  and	  our	  aim	  
in	  this	  brief	  commentary	  is	  to	  try	  to	  help	  clear	  the	  path	  a	  little.	  
	  
Just	  as	  Cirelli	  and	  Tononi	   (2008)	  consider	  alternatives	   to	   the	  “null	  hypothesis”	   that	  
sleep	   serves	   no	   essential	   function,	   Johnson	   considers	   alternatives	   to	   the	   null	  
hypothesis	   that	   atheism	   simply	   represents	   one	   end	   of	   a	   continuum	   of	   belief	   (see	  
McKay	   &	   Dennett,	   2009,	   for	   related	   hypotheses	   about	   disordered	   reading	   and	  
Attention-­‐Deficit	  Hyperactivity	  Disorder).	  He	  is	  reluctant,	  however,	  to	  champion	  any	  
of	  these	  alternatives,	  and	  we	  think	  this	  reticence	  is	  telling.	  He	  suggests	  that	  many	  of	  
the	  predictions	  he	  outlines	  “could	  be	   relatively	  easily	  explored	  using	  mathematical	  
models,	  empirical	  studies,	  or	  laboratory	  experiments”,	  but	  we	  suspect	  that	  a	  serious	  
effort	  to	  sharpen	  many	  of	  them	  would	  expose	  numerous	  problems	  of	  interpretation	  
and	  equivocation.	  
	  
Although	   Johnson	   favors	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   natural	   variation,	   the	   alternative	  
hypothesis	   that	  he	   finds	  most	  compelling	   is	  his	  “Hypothesis	  8”,	   that	  atheists	   foster	  
solidarity	  among	  the	  religious	  and	  thereby	  increase	  the	  fitness	  of	  religious	  believers.	  
Although	   we	   are	   amused	   by	   the	   irony	   in	   this	   suggestion	   (imagine	   how	   horrified	  
Richard	  Dawkins	  and	  PZ	  Myers	  would	  be	  to	  discover	  that,	  all	  along,	   they	  had	  been	  
doing	   God’s	   work!),	   we	   are	   unconvinced	   by	   the	   claim	   that	   this	   hypothesis	   has	  
“copious	  contemporary	  evidence”.	  The	  evidence	  that	  Johnson	  cites	  seems	  to	  consist	  
of	  little	  more	  than	  a	  quote	  by	  Jonathan	  Sacks,	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  chief	  rabbi.	  One	  
could	  with	  equal	  (that	   is	  to	  say,	  slender)	   justification	  surmise	  that	  the	  new	  atheists	  
are	  bolstering	   religious	  solidarity	   (and	  hence	  “doing	  God’s	  work”)	  by	  predating	   the	  
weak	   and	   inferior	   believers	   from	   congregations	   around	   the	   world,	   leaving	   leaner,	  
more	  robust	   flocks!	   In	  any	  case,	  while	   it	   is	  uncontroversial	   to	  suggest	   that	  atheists	  
may	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  bolstering	  religious	  communities,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  how	  any	  
group	  selection	  phenomenon	  could	  secure	  that	  this	  is	  a	  function	  of	  atheist	  activities,	  
requiring	  differential	  replication	  of	  religious	  communities.	  
	  
For	  new	  atheists	  like	  Dennett,	  whose	  professed	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  extinguish	  religion	  but	  
to	  provoke	  its	  metamorphosis	  into	  more	  benign	  forms,1	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  and	  
valuable	   to	   discover	   if	   the	   positive	   effects	   of	   new	   atheism	   are	   outweighed	   by	   the	  
hardening	  of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  those	  who	  feel	  threatened	  (see	  Nyhan	  &	  Reifler,	  2010,	  
for	  a	  similar	  effect	  in	  the	  political	  sphere).	  Dennett	  and	  Lascola's	  (2010)	  confidential	  
interviews	  with	  closeted	  non-­‐believing	  preachers	  have	  turned	  up	  clergy	  who	  set	  out	  
to	  read	  the	  works	  of	  the	  new	  atheists	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  "the	  enemy"	  and	  
ended	  up	  switching	  sides,	   largely	  on	  the	  strength	  of	   those	   forcefully	  written	  books	  
(e.g.,	  Harris,	  2004;	  Dawkins,	  2006;	  Dennett,	  2006;	  Hitchens,	  2007).	  
	  
The	  important	  question,	  which	  remains,	  to	  our	  knowledge,	  unaddressed,	  is	  whether	  
such	   attrition	   of	   believers	   leaves	   the	   residual	   congregation	   more	   or	   less	   open	   to	  
change,	   and	  more	   or	   less	   likely	   to	   thrive.	   	   Time	   will	   tell,	   but	   time’s	   message	   will	  
probably	  be	  equivocal:	  some	  congregations	  will	  go	  extinct	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  departures	  
of	  apostates,	  and	  others	  will	   close	   ranks	  and	   thrive	   (or	  not);	   some	  will	   reform	  and	  
some	  will	  resist	  reform.	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  any	  clear	  selective	  signal	  will	  emerge	  
from	  this,	  and	  certainly	  not	  over	  any	  short	  time	  span	  of,	  say,	  a	  century.	  
	  
On	  this	  last	  point,	  the	  distinction	  between	  genetic	  and	  cultural	  evolution	  needs	  to	  be	  
more	  closely	  observed,	  as	   it	   is	  only	  cultural	  evolution	   that	  can	  produce	   the	  sort	  of	  
swift	  and	  visible	  effects	  involved	  in	  some	  of	  the	  scenarios	  Johnson	  outlines.	  At	  times	  
he	   seems	   to	   forget	   that	   it	   takes	   a	   persistent	   selection	   pressure	   over	   many	  
generations	  to	  achieve	  a	  genetic	  effect.	  Moreover,	  genetic	  evolution	  entails	  variable	  
numbers	   of	   surviving	   offspring,	   but	   the	   burden	   of	   demonstrating	   increases	   in	  
reproductive	   fitness	   for	   atheists	   over	   the	   relevant	   time	   spans	   is	   onerous	   (and	  
contemporary	   evidence	   suggests	   just	   the	   opposite;	   see	   Frejka	   &	  Westhoff,	   2008;	  
Zhang,	  2008;	  Blume,	  2009).	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  strangest	  hypothesis	  that	  Johnson	  considers	  is	  his	  “Hypothesis	  1”,	  that	  
there	   are	   no	   atheists	   (and	   never	   have	   been).	   Clearly	   much	   will	   rest	   on	   issues	   of	  
definition	  with	   a	   suggestion	   like	   this,	   but	   on	   even	   the	  most	  minimal	   definitions	  of	  
“belief”	  and	  “supernatural	  agency”	  it	  seems	  plain	  that	  there	  are	  individuals	  who	  do	  
not	  believe	   in	   supernatural	   agents	  –	   individuals	  who	  would	  bet	  not	   just	   their	   lives	  
but	  their	  afterlives	  on	  the	  proposition	  that	  such	  agents	  do	  not	  exist.	  Nevertheless,	  if	  
relevant	   falsifiable	   predictions	   could	   be	   identified	   we	   might	   at	   least	   concede	   the	  
empirical	  possibility	  that	  atheists	  do	  not	  exist	   (however	  unlikely	  we	  might	  think	   it).	  
According	   to	   Johnson,	  however,	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   there	  are	  no	  atheists	  predicts	  
“no	  fitness	  effects	  on	  atheists	  (because	  there	  are	  none)”	  and	  “no	  fitness	  effects	  on	  
believers”.	  It’s	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  testable	  –	  or	  even	  logically	  coherent	  –	  
empirical	  predictions.	  
	  
                                                
1 Johnson	   quotes	  Wilson’s	   (2009)	   mischaracterization	   of	   Dennett’s	   (2006)	   Breaking	   the	   Spell	   -­‐	   the	  
'spell'	  in	  question	  is	  actually	  not	  religion	  itself	  but	  the	  taboo	  against	  investigating	  religion	  as	  a	  natural	  
phenomenon. 
In	  summary,	  although	  we	  find	  Johnson’s	  approach	  novel	  and	  thought	  provoking,	  we	  
think	   the	   path	   he	   has	   sketched	   is	  much	   stonier	   than	   he	   acknowledges.	  We	   know	  
from	  personal	  experience	  (McKay	  &	  Dennett,	  2009)	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  transform	  a	  
plausible	   hunch	   into	   a	   testable	   hypothesis,	   and	  we	   think	  more	   clarity	   –	   and	  more	  
caution	  -­‐	   is	  necessary	  here	  to	  delineate	  the	  various	  theoretical	  possibilities	  and	  the	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